In this article I address two interrelated questions: have the group bases of the American political parties changed over time and what factors have lead to the observed changes? I determine social group memberships significantly influence individual partisanship with a multivariate analysis using 56 years of ANES data. I then measure how many votes each politically relevant social group contributed to the party coalitions in each presidential election from 1952 to 2008. I discuss how group contributions have changed over time and establish the demographic and behavioral causes of group contribution change. I find that the party coalitions have been restructured as a result of groups' changing voting behavior and the changing ratio of groups in the electorate.
a b s t r a c t
In this article I address two interrelated questions: have the group bases of the American political parties changed over time and what factors have lead to the observed changes? I determine social group memberships significantly influence individual partisanship with a multivariate analysis using 56 years of ANES data. I then measure how many votes each politically relevant social group contributed to the party coalitions in each presidential election from 1952 to 2008. I discuss how group contributions have changed over time and establish the demographic and behavioral causes of group contribution change. I find that the party coalitions have been restructured as a result of groups' changing voting behavior and the changing ratio of groups in the electorate.
Ó 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
It is difficult to discuss electoral politics in the United States without talking in terms of social groups. Journalistic accounts of party competition often stress the important role that specific constituencies play (such as the "evangelical" or "Latino" vote) in determining the outcome of presidential elections. A society's socio-demographic cleavages are typically the same divisions that give structure to political competitiondone party derives the majority of its support from voters on one side of the cleavage while the opposing party obtains its support from voters on the other side (Key, 1949; Schattschneider, 1960; Lipset and Rokkan, 1964 ). Yet, the party system is dynamic in spite of enduring social cleavages; the group bases of party support have dramatically changed. How have the parties' social bases changed over time? In this article I investigate and identify the demographic and behavioral forces that drive changes in the party coalitions.
I must ask and answer two related questions in order to understand how the party coalitions have changed. First, I must determine what the parties' social bases actually aredwhat social group memberships actually structure individual level voting behavior? Second, once I have established the set of politically relevant groups, the task becomes measuring the number of votes each group contributes to the party coalitions and then assessing how demographic and behavioral changes have affected the size of each group's contribution. Electoral behavior is most often thought of in terms of partisan vote choice and there is a considerable amount of research devoted to understanding how and why patterns of vote choice change over time. My approach goes beyond looking at one aspect of voting behavior and assesses the combined effect of both behavioral and demographic factors. Political parties must capture more votes than the opposition in order to windthus, any process that leads to a party obtaining more or less votes is politically consequential. Any change of a group's voting behavior (vote choice or turnout) or size affects how many votes the group contributes to a party's coalition. Analyzing these components in conjunction with one another allows for a more holistic understanding of party coalitions than can be gained from examining any of one of these behavioral or demographic components individually.
This paper is organized in the following format. In the first section I use a multivariate analysis of ANES data to uncover the group determinants of individual vote choice in each presidential election spanning 1952 through 2008. This analysis establishes which group memberships serve as political reference points and which group memberships do not.
2 Individuals are members of numerous overlapping groups, but only some of these group memberships actually affect political behavior. Establishing what groups shape individual vote choice will allow me limit the proceeding analyses of the group bases of the electoral coalitions to only "politically relevant" groupsddefined as group memberships that have a significant effect on individual voting behavior. In the second section I assess how many votes each politically relevant group contributes to each party's coalition. In addition, I analyze how the sizes of groups' contributions have changed and I assess the behavioral and demographic sources of these changes. I discuss the implications of the parties' changing sources of electoral support in the third section and make several brief concluding remarks in the fourth section.
Identifying the group bases of political competition
The link between group identification and political behavior is well establisheddgroup memberships form the mouth of the American Voter's "funnel of causation" that ultimately explains vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960, 292 ; also see Miller and Shanks, 1996; Lewis-Beck et al. 2006) . Social groups are an important part of politicsdgroup memberships influence an individual's political attitudes and behaviors (Campbell et al. 1960; Dawson, 1994; Green et al. 2002) and party appeals are often targeted towards members of specific social groups (Huckfeldt et al. 1995) . Thus, party coalitions are often thought of in terms of an aggregation of groups (Axelrod, 1972; Manza and Brooks, 1999) and the most dramatic reshuffling of the party coalitions occur when a group that was once loyal to one party begins to support the opposition.
However, any analysis of the group bases of politics must address several practical and theoretical issues before moving forward. Firstly, there is the question of what group memberships actually serve as the basis for political organization? Individuals are simultaneously members of a number of overlapping groups (e.g. African American, female, heterosexual, left handed, baseball fan) and not all group memberships serve as "political reference points" for the formation of attitudesdsome group memberships are politicized while others are not (Campbell et al. 1960; Stanley et al., 1986) . Thus, I need to establish what group memberships significantly influence vote choice before assessing how the group bases of the political parties have changed.
I adopt a similar empirical approach to that of Stanley, Bianco and Niemi in an effort to accomplish this task (1986; and updated in 1991 and updated in , 1995 and updated in , 2006 and updated in and 2010 Niemi; also see Manza and Brooks, 1999; Raymond, 2011 Niemi included in some of their earlier analyses. The set of independent variables are broadly similar with the exception of these few differences. 4 The list of demographic independent variables included in the analysis is essentially all of the demographic variables available in the entirety of years included in the ANES cumulative file.
over the course of the time series. Using categories such as the top or bottom third of the income distribution provides a metric that common across all years in the series (Stanley and Niemi, 1991, 191) . I run a separate regression for each decade, starting in the 1950s and ending in the 2000s, with the goal of assessing how the influence of each group membership changed over time. Table 1 contains the results of these logit models and Fig. 1 substantively illustrates the effect of each variable by decade. The base category in Fig. 1 is a white, Protestant, non-Southern male in the middle third of the income distribution between the ages of 36 and 64. The effect of each independent variable is the first difference comparison against the base category.
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The results in Table 1 indicate that the effect of specific group memberships have evolved over the past sixty years while the effect of other group memberships has remained consistent. Jews, Catholics, Latinos and union members have been significantly more likely to support the Democratic Party than non-group members in all decades included in the analysis. African Americans were not significantly more likely to support the Democratic Party during the 1950s (the Republican Party held the civil rights mantle at the time) but became so in the 1960s. Unsurprisingly, since the 1960s, African Americans have been twenty to thirty percentage points more likely than non-African Americans to vote for the Democratic Party (compared to whites, the base category) even when controlling for income. Indentifying as a Jew has a similar effect on the likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate as identifying as an African American, both in terms of magnitude and consistency. Union members and Catholics are consistently ten percentage points more likely to vote for the Democratic presidential candidate than non-group members across all decades, indicating that the political importance of these specific group memberships has endured through time. Standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
5 Fig. 1 displays the first differences of each coefficient. A first difference of .1 means that when the variable is set to 1 (opposed to 0) an individual is .1 more likely to support the Democratic Party. Point predictions at zero with no confidence intervals surrounding them should be interpreted as categories with no data for the given decade. For instance, the ANES did not include "Latino" as a racial/ethnic category in the 1960s, hence there is no estimate of the coefficient.
The effect of other group memberships have not been consistent, rather they have evolved over time. White Southerners were significantly more likely to support the Democratic Party than other whites during the 1950s. However, Southern whites have drifted towards the Republican Party. Southern white group membership became an increasingly strong predictor of Republican vote choice over the second half of the 20th century. Similarly, weekly church attendees were significantly more likely to support Democrats during the 1960s, but became progressively less Democratic over the 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, weekly church attendees were significantly more likely to vote for Republican presidential candidates. In recent elections, both Southern whites and weekly church attendees were nearly 10 percentage points more likely to support the Republican candidate when compared to the base category. Likewise, in the 1950s women were significantly more likely to support the Republican Party. However, females were no more likely than males to support the Republican Party in the 1960s and 1970s and from the 1980s onward women have been 5 to 7 percentage points more likely to support the Democrats. Other group memberships that were once not significant predictors of vote choice have recently become significant predictors of Democratic vote choice. College graduates and the non-religious became more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate beginning in the 1970sdby the 2000s college graduates were 10 percentage points more likely to support the Democratic candidate while the nonreligious were 5 percentage points more likely.
The majority of the other group memberships included in the analysis never have a statistically significant effect or only have only a fleeting influence on vote choice (e.g. the variable has a statistically significant effect in one decade but none of the others). Voters under 35 were significantly more likely to support Republican candidates during the 1970s and 1980s but not in any other decades. Likewise, voters over 65 were more likely to support Democrats in the 1950s, but more likely to support Republicans in the 1960s and then statistically indistinguishable from the base category after that. Income category, Asian and urban did not have a consistent effect over the course of the analysis. Birth cohort never has a significant effect on vote choice, therefore I have omitted the birth cohort variables from Table 1 and Fig. 1 in order to clarify the presentation. Stated briefly, the main conclusions that can be drawn from the information displayed in Table 1 and Fig. 1 can be summarized as this: 1) Some group memberships have a consistent and significant effect on vote choice across all (or nearly all) decades includingdAfrican Americans, Latinos, Jews, union members, whites, Protestants and Catholics.
2) The effect of some group memberships moves in a consistent direction over time as the group becomes consistently more Democratic or Republican. These groups includedwhite Southerners, the non-religious, weekly church attendees, college graduates, men and women.
3) Other group memberships never have a consistently significant effect on vote choice across all decades includingdage group, birth cohorts, income category, urbanism and Asian.
The preceding analysis demonstrated that the effect of some group memberships has been consistent, while the effect of others has changed over the course of the last 60 Table 1 ).
years. The fact that the influence of some group memberships changes over time highlights the dynamism of party competition. However, the dynamics of coalition formation are more complicated than understanding what group memberships influence individual vote choice. Winning elections is not simply a function of having some core groups of loyal supporters; parties have to obtain enough votes to form an electoral majority. A party's ability to form an electoral majority is ultimately determined by the number of votes they are able to acquire. How many votes a group actually contributes to a coalition is a product of a group's size and rate of turnout in addition to party loyalty. Gaining an understanding coalition dynamics requires an understanding of where the parties' votes are actually coming from and how these sources of electoral support have changed over time. In the next section I develop a measurement strategy with the goal of estimating how many votes each politically relevant group contributed to the party coalitions in each election from 1952 to 2008.
Group contributions to the party coalitions
I demonstrated the following group memberships significantly influence individual vote choice in the previous section:
Having established what group memberships structure individual voting decisions, I now turn to assessing how many votes politically relevant groups contribute to the party coalitions. The size of a group's contribution to a party's coalition is a product of three factors: 1) Loyaltydthe proportion of group members that support the party 2) Turnoutdthe proportion of group members that actually vote 3) Sizedthe group's proportion of the total population
All three of these components must be taken into account when measuring group contributions because no individual component tells the entire story on its own (Axelrod, 1972, 12) . My estimates of group contributions are generated using the measure created by Robert Axelrod in his 1972 (and updated in 1974, 1978, 1982 and 1986) APSR article entitled "Where the votes come from: An analysis of electoral coalitions [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] ." Axelrod's measure combines a group's size, turnout and loyalty to create a single measure of a group's contribution to a party's coalition (please consult the Appendix for the computational details). A group's contribution to a party's coalition is defined as the proportion of the party's votes that come from members of the group (Axelrod, 1972, 12) .
6 Table 2 
Exploring the sources of group contribution change
There are three reasons why a group's contribution could change over time: 1) Conversion dA group's loyalty to a party increases or decreases 2) MobilizationdA group's rate of turnout increases or decreases 3) Demographic ChangedThere are more or less voters in the group as a proportion of the total population compared to previous elections Electoral change is frequently discussed in behavioral termsdobservers of politics frequently discuss the electoral consequences of changing group loyalty or turnout. However, demographic changes can have a profound impact on political competition. The political history of the United States is marked by numerous examples of changes in electoral outcomes that occurred as a result of a shifting pool of votersdthe creation of the New Deal Coalition in 1932 is a particularly striking example of this process in action. Andersen (1979; also see Key, 1955; Petrocik, 1981; Sundquist, 1983) argued that the entrance and subsequent mobilization of new immigrant voters in the electorate was the driving force behind the establishment of the Democratic New Deal Coalition. Widespread Southern and Eastern European immigration changed the demographic composition of the U.S. quite dramatically; by the 1930s many of the major eastern U.S. cities had populations that approached 50 percent foreign-born (Andersen, 1979, 30-6 The measures of group size, national turnout, and national loyalty (measured as party share of the two party vote) are all obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The group turnout and loyalty measures are derived from the ANES survey, but corrected to reflect national turnout and loyalty measures. It is typical that more individuals report having voted on surveys than actually did in reality, likewise, more individuals typically report having voted for the election winner than actually did in reality. In order to correct for the over reporting of voting, the group turnout and loyalty rates derived from the raw ANES data are adjusted in order to make them congruent with the known national totals. According to Axelrod (1972, pg 13) , "The adjustment procedure is an iterative process by which a contingency table with given marginal distributions while preserving the nature and strength of the association, as measured by appropriate criteria." Mosteller initially developed this technique in a 1968 article entitled, "Association and Estimation in Contingency Tables." Any difference between the Axelrod's reported estimates and my own are the result of Axelrod's use of pairwise deletion to deal with missing data or with slight variations in the data coding. However, the differences between Axelrod's estimates and my own estimates are trivial when we construct estimates for the same groups.
7 It is important to note that the proportion of party's coalition that is comprised of a specific group is a function of both the group's size and voting behavior as well as the voting behavior of the rest of the electorate. For instance, African Americans are very loyal to the Democratic Party. In poor Democratic years, many voters abandon the Democratic Party for the Republicans, but African Americans typically do not. Therefore, African Americans tend to make up a greater proportion of the Democratic coalition in years where the Democrats fair poorly among most other groups.
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). The rapid growth of the electorate made it possible for the Democratic Party to form a winning coalition by mobilizing voters that were not previously incorporated within the coalition. Recent political history reaffirms the role that both behavioral and demographic changes play in reshaping the party coalitions. Table 3 displays the trends in voting behavior and demographics that are responsible for the changing group contributions to the party coalitions. The first row in Table 3 shows the long-term trend of each group's contribution to the party coalition, which can be increasing, declining or stable. The next three rows summarize the trend in the group's partisan loyalty, turnout and size. If the group's contribution has changed, it must ultimately be a result of variation in one or more of these three inputs. 
Changes in the Democratic coalition
The Democratic Party has been acquiring an increasing proportion of their total votes from African Americans, Latinos, the non-religious, college graduates and women; but there are disparate reasons why these groups are contributing more votes to the Democratic coalition. The contribution made by African Americans has steadily increased. African Americans have become a larger proportion of the Democratic coalition as a result of increasing turnout. African American group size and loyalty have remained essentially unchanged over the last sixty years, however, turnout has increased substantially. In recent years, African American turnout was on par with white turnout, eliminating the historical disparity between white and black turnout and increasing the size of the African American contribution to the Democratic coalition.
Latinos have also been making greater contributions to the Democratic Party's coalition. There are two reasons for this increase: markedly higher levels of mobilization and rapidly growing group size. Latinos have been consistently loyal to the Democratic Partydbut recent elections have seen an unprecedented increase in mobilization amongst this previously electorally latent group. Only 20 to 30 percent of Latinos were mobilized during 1990s.
9 Latino turnout has increased over the last several elections; Latino turnout hit 43 percent in 2008. The increase in mobilization is doubly consequential because Latinos have more than doubled as a proportion of the total U.S. population over the last 30 years, which is largely attributable to the dramatic shift in U.S. immigration policy in 1965 (Tichenor, 2002) . Another group that is becoming an increasingly important Democratic constituency is the non-religious. Non-religious voters have always been loyal to the Democratic Party but the portion of the population that identifies as nonreligious has moved from 7 percent of the population in 1972 to 18 percent in 2008. This growing group of secular votersda group that barely existed at the time of Axelrod's initial analysisdis now an important constituency in the Democratic coalition. The opposite is true of union members. The behavior of union members has been relatively constant over the past 60 yearsdunion members have remained loyal to the Democratic Party and have continued turnout at a rate that is higher the national average. Yet, the proportion of the electorate made up of union members has steadily declined. Right to work laws and an increasingly servicebased economy have reduced union membership considerably (Moore, 1998 )dfrom a third of the population in the 1950s to less than 15 percent in the 2000s. The stability Table 3 Trends in group loyalty, turnout and size.
Democratic groups
Republican groups
8 Trends in group loyalty and turnout were figured relative to the national average in a given year in order to account for year-to-year variations in national level turnout and party loyalty. Thus, these trends should be interpreted as, "how does group loyalty and turnout compare to the national average over time," opposed to "what is the trend in the absolute level of group loyalty and turnout."
in the voting behavior of union members is indicative of the fact that the change in union contribution to the Democratic coalition is due almost entirely to the shrinking size of the group. The proportion of the Democratic Party's coalition that is comprised of Catholics has also declined. Unlike union members, the size of the Catholic population has remained stable over the past sixty years. The shrinking Catholic contribution is a product of declining Democratic loyalty and turnout. Inner city Catholic immigrants were a core component of the Democratic "New Deal" coalition (Andersen, 1979; Petrocik, 1981 The Democratic Party has drawn an increasing proportion of votes from women over the past 60 years. Obviously the proportion of females in the population has not changed, which implies that the growth of the female contribution is a result of behavioral changes. The gender gap in partisan loyalty that emerged during the 1970s has become increasingly pronounced. Women were more likely than men to support the Republican Party during the 1950s and 1960s, but female Republican loyalty eroded during the 1970s. Women have been 8 to 10 points more loyal to the Democratic Party than men in recent elections. While the gap between male and female partisanship is frequently discussed, what frequently goes unnoticed is that female mobilization has increased as well. Female turnout lagged behind men's for the majority of the elections covered in this analysisdbut turnout in recent elections has matched or exceeded male turnout in both 2004 and 2008. These two elections were the first times that women had a higher rate of turnout over the fifty-six year span of the data.
Finally, college graduates have also become an increasingly important component of the Democratic coalition. College graduates make up a much larger portion of the population now (30%) compared to even 30 years ago (15%). Moreover, college graduates were once a reliably Republican constituency, but the group has drifted towards the Democratic Party in recent elections. The increasing group size and Democratic loyalty of college graduates has dramatically increased the group's contribution to the Democratic coalition.
Changes in the Republican coalition
The Democratic Party has benefited from the fact that many loyal Democratic constituencies are growing. The Republican Party is facing the opposite scenario; many traditionally Republican constituencies are declining as a proportion of the electorate. The decline of the white proportion of the population is perhaps the most striking demographic change that has occurred in the county over the last half century. In 1960 the country was 89 percent white, by 2008 this number had shrank to 63 percent. While the white population is still growing in absolute terms, the growth in the white population has been outstripped by the rapid growth of the Latino and Asian populations. White turnout has not substantially changed over the past 60 yearsdbut whites have become increasingly loyal to the Republican Party in recent elections, which explains why the white contribution to the Republican coalition has not substantially declined in spite of the decline of group size.
The uptick in white Republican loyalty is largely a product of the Republican conversion of Southern Whites. Southern Whites were once thought of as one of the core groups in the Democratic "New Deal" coalitiondAxelrod identified the South as one of the key Democratic constituencies in his 1972 analysis. The dramatic social upheaval that surrounded the civil rights movement in the 1960s had a profound and lasting impact on the voting behavior of Southern whites. Southern whites were predisposed to vote for Democratic Party until the Democratic Party adopted a progressive stance on civil rights (see Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld, 1989; Frymer, 2010; and (Nesmith, 1994) . However, the increasing loyalty of weekly church attendees is partially mitigated by the fact that the proportion of weekly church attendees has droppedddeclining from 40 percent in 1972 to 31 percent in 2008. The religious divide is now defined by the cleavage between the secular and the religious opposed to the cleavage between Catholics and Protestants, which has declined in political importance. Finally, males' contribution to the Republican coalition has remained unchanged. While male turnout has slightly declined, male loyalty to the Republican Party has slightly increased, resulting in no net change in contribution.
Implications for the future of U.S. party competition
The previous analysis demonstrated the important role that demographic and behavioral changes play in reshaping party coalitions. In this section I discuss the how the parties' changing social bases are likely to affect the future of American party competition. The results of this analysis clearly demonstrate that demographic changes are of considerable political importance. While many analyses of group support focus on the rate that groups support one party over the other, this analysis shows that the ratio of groups is also consequential. The outcome of recent elections highlights the importance of demographic changes.
Prior to Barack Obama in 2008, the Democratic candidates that have managed to win over the last 40 years have done so by being able to form a coalition that includes significantly more white voters than losing Democratic candidates. Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton were both able to win by attracting a much larger percentage of the white vote (especially in the South) than did the candidates that preceded or followed them (or in Carter's case, better than he did in his own reelection bid in 1980). The Obama victory in 2008 marked a departure from the previous Democratic victories of Carter in 1976 and Clinton in 1992 and 1996 . Obama did not significantly improve upon the performance of Kerry or Gore among whites (and preformed even worse than Kerry or Gore among Southern whites), yet he managed to win by assembling a coalition comprised of an unprecedented amount of minority votersdwhich was made possible by the country's changing demographic composition. In addition, Obama also benefitted from record high turnout among African Americans and Latinos. Obama's level of support among whites was nearly identical to Walter Mondale's in 1984. The key difference is that while Mondale managed to only win one state (and the District of Columbia), Obama was able to form an electoral majority in both the popular vote and Electoral College.
Thus far the Republican Party has been able to offset the shrinking size of their core groups by winning a greater proportion of the white vote and by turning out core groups at a high rate. The Republican Party must find a way to expand their base of electoral support in future elections in order to remain electorally competitive. The Republican Party could accomplish this by gaining a higher level of support from groups that are already loyal to the Republican Party or by attracting more support among groups that currently favor the Democrats. Further evolution of the party coalitions seems likely in the future, given the political consequences of inexorable demographic trends and the competitive nature of American presidential elections.
Concluding remarks
The make up of the party coalitions has changed a great deal over the second half of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century; the Democratic Party's coalition increasingly consists of non-whites and Republican Party has become more Southern. Perhaps the most interesting theoretical question that is implied by this analysis is how the stability of the party system is maintained. National elections are consistently competitive in the U.S. (Bartels, 1998 ). Yet, the electorate is always changing and demographic changes often benefit one party over the other. Stokes and Iversen (1962) were the first to demonstrate the fact that there are "forces that restore party competition" in the United States. These forces are still unidentified, but the level of electoral stability amidst all of the change implies that these unidentified restorative forces are indeed at work. A possible extension of this analysis would be to see if groups move "in tandem," or in other words, is the decline in Democratic support by one group is typically offset by the gain in support from another social group? Ultimately, the questions addressed in this article are fundamental to understanding party competition. Understanding how many votes groups actually contribute to the party coalitions how these contributions have changed over time is essential for understanding the patterns of continuity and change in American electoral politics.
Appendix
Appendix A. Variable coding.
Group Coding
White White respondents were indentified using the "Race" variable (VCF0106a) from the ANES cumulative file. Whites were coded as a 1 if "VCF0106a" equaled 1 African Americans African American respondents were indentified using the "Race" variable (VCF0106a) from the ANES cumulative file. African Americans were coded as a 1 if "VCF0106a" equaled 2 Latinos and Asians
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